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Introduction
In more and more areas of life decisions are the result of interactions between humans and machines. We encounter automated systems no longer only in a supportive capacity but, more frequently, as systems taking actions on their own. For example, computer assisted driving services drive autonomously on roads 1 and surgical systems conduct surgeries independently. 2 As a result, humans nd themselves confronted with a new situation: they share decisions with a machine. We call such a situation a hybrid decision situation. 3 In this paper we investigate human decision-making in a hybrid decision situation. More speci cally, we investigate whether sharing a decision with a computer instead of with another human has an in uence on the perception of the situation, thus a ecting human decisions. Human decision-making in groups with other humans has been researched extensively. Fischer et al. (2011) show in their meta study on the so called bystander e ect that the perceived personal responsibility is lower when others are around. 4 eoretical work from Ba igalli and Dufwenberg (2007) and Rothenhäusler et al. (2013) also suggests that people feel less guilty for an outcome when a decision is shared. Furthermore, a meta study by Engel (2011) , including 255 experimental papers on behavior in Dictator Games 5 shows that people behave more sel shly if a decision is shared. However, so far, the literature has only focused on decisions shared between humans. Here we ask whether humans also perceive themselves to be less responsible and guilty and behave more sel shly when the decision is shared with a computer.
As a workhorse, we use a binary Dictator Game. We compare three treatments: a Dictator Game with a single human dictator, a Dictator Game with two human dictators, and a Dictator Game with one human dictator and a computer.
e remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review focusing on experimental evidence from economics and social psychological research. We expecially discuss the literature on individual behavior in groups as well as ndings from research on human-computer interactions. In Section 3 we present our experimental design and explain our treatments in more detail. Section 4 relates the experiment to the theoretical background and derives behavioral predictions. Results are presented in Section 5. e last 1 See for example the Tesla with full self-driving hardware or the NVIDIA AI car which learns from human based on machine learning. 2 For example, Shademan et al. (2016) reports a so tissue surgery conducted by an autonomous system. 3 However, machines do not always perform be er than humans and are also susceptible to errors. e 2016 Disengagement Reports, reports of autonomous vehicle incidents on California public road that all manufacturers in California have to provide to the State of California Department of Motor Vehicles, state 2665 cases in which the test driver had to disengage the autonomous mode (see https://www.dmv.ca.gov/ portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/disengagement_report_2016) In an international survey about an automized urological surgery by Kaushik et al. (2010) 56.8% of 176 responding surgeons reported to have experienced an irrecoverable intraoperative malfunction of the robotic system. 4 e bystander e ect, rst described by Latané and Nida (1981) , is a social psychological phenomenon that individuals are less likely to help a victim if others are present. 5 e Dictator Game typically consists of two individuals. One individual -known as the dictator -is given some money. e dictator then has to decide how much of this money he/she wants to share with the other individual.
e other individual -called the recipient -has to accept any amount of money the dictator proposes.
2 section o ers a discussion and some concluding remarks.
Review of the literature
In Section 2.1 below, we present former research on individual decision-making in groups most similar to our experiment. We point out studies explaining why humans behave more sel shly when deciding with other humans. In Section 2.2, we turn to research on humancomputer interactions. We outline what is already known about how machines are perceived and how humans behave towards them.
Shared decision-making with humans
People frequently have to make decisions in situations wherein the outcome not only depends on their choice but also on the choices of others. In a number of experimental games, such as the Trust Game (Kugler et al., 2007) , the Ultimatum Game (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998) , the Coordination Game (Bland and Nikiforakis, 2015) , the Signaling Game (Cooper and Kagel, 2005) , the Prisoners Dilemma (McGlynn et al., 2009) , the Gi Exchange Game (Kocher and Su er, 2007) , the Public Good Games (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004) as well as in lo eries (Rockenbach et al., 2007) and Beauty Contests (Kocher and Su er, 2005; Su er, 2005) , people have been found to behave more sel sh, less trustworthy and less altruistic toward an outsider when deciding together with others.
Even in a game as simple as the Dictator Game, where one person -the dictator -decides how to split an endowment between herself and another person -the recipient -who has no say, people behave in a more strategic and sel sh way when deciding in groups compared to individual decision-making. For example, Dana et al. (2007) nd that in a situation where two dictators decide simultaneously and the sel sh outcome is implemented only if both dictators agree on it, 65% of all dictators choose the sel sh option, while only 26% of all dictators choose the sel sh option when deciding alone. is observation is con rmed by Luhan et al. (2009) . In their experiment 23.4% of a dictator's endowment is sent to the recipient team consisting of three subjects when the dictator decides alone but only 10.8% is sent to the recipients when the dictator acts as a members of a three-person team. Panchanathan et al. (2013) also found that dictators give signi canlty less money to the recipient in the three dictator condition (8.8%) than in the two dictator condition (11.61%) or in the single dictator condition (27.8%).
Although experimental evidence shows that people behave more sel shly in shared decisions, we do not know much about the driving forces behind it. Falk and Szech (2013) and Bartling et al. (2015) presume that individuals behave more sel shly when deciding in groups as the pivotality for the nal outcome is di used. is di usion lowers the individual decisiveness for the nal outcome and makes it easier to choose the self interested option. According to Ba igalli and Dufwenberg (2007) , human might also aim at reducing the feeling of guilt caused by a decision. Building on this idea, Rothenhäusler et al. (2013) conclude that group-decisions allow to share the guilt for an individual decision and thus makes it easier to choose a sel sh option in a group.
ere are also concepts in social psychology explaining more sel sh decision-making in groups than in individual decision situations. Darley and Latané (1968) propose the concept of di usion of responsibility: sel sh decisions in groups are caused by the possibility to share the responsibility for the outcome among group members. is idea is con rmed by several studies in social psychology. In a study by Forsyth et al. (2002) participants were asked to allocate 100 responsibility points among the members of the group (group size either 2, 4, 6, or 8 participants) a er a group task was performed.
e personal perceived responsibility for the group outcome was signi cantly lower the bigger the group. Freeman et al. (1975) study tipping behavior in restaurants. ey show that people in groups tipp on average less than individuals. Freeman et al. explain this nding with the di used responsibility for tipping. Further possible mechanisms driving sel sh decision-making in groups are suggested by research on the so called interindividualintergroup discontinuity e ect by Insko et al. (1990) , an e ect that describes the tendency of individuals to be more competitive and less cooperative in groups than in one-on-one relations. According to this research there are four moderators promoting sel sh decisions in groups. First, the social-support-for-shared-self-interest hypothesis claims that group members can perceive an active support for a self-interested choice by other group members. Second, the identi ability hypothesis proposes that deciding in groups provides a shield of anonymity that could also drive sel sh decision-making. ird, according to the ingroup-favouring norm, decision makers could perceive some pressure to rst bene t the own group before taking into account the interests of others. And nally, the altruistic-rationalization hypothesis suggest that deciding in a group enables individuals to justify their own sel sh behavior by arguing that the other group members will also bene t from it. According to a meta study of 48 experiments on the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity e ect by Wildschut et al. (2003) intergroup interactions are indeed in gerneral more competitive than interindividual interactions.
To sum up, more sel sh decision-making in groups seems to be driven by the di used pivotality for the decision, a lower level of perceived responsibility and guilt for the outcome, the increased anonymity of the decision and the feeling that a sel sh decision also favours the group and is supported or even demanded by the members of the group.
Perception of and behavior towards computers
A number of studies nd that people treat computers in much the same way they treat people. For instance, Katagiri et al. (2001) show that people apply social norms from their own culture to a computer. Reeves and Nass (2003) found that people are as polite to computers as they are to humans in laboratory experiments. Nass et al. (1994) shows that people seem to use social rules in addressing computer behavior. Nass and Moon (2000) observe that people ascribe human-like a ributes to computers. In a laboratory experiment by Nass et al. (1996) , where subjects were told to be interdependent with a computer a liate, the computer were perceived just like a human teammate. Moon and Nass (1998) even observe that humans have a tendency to blame a computer for failure and take the credit for success when they feel dissimilar to it while blaming themselves for failure and crediting the computer for success when they feel similar to it. Other studies nd that computers are held at least partly responsible for actions. Friedman (1995) reports in an inverview on computer angency and moral responsibility for computer errors that 83% of the computers science major 4 students a ributed aspects of agency such as decision-making and/or intention to the computer, 21% of the students even held the computer moral responsible for wrongdoing. Moon (2003) show that the self-serving tendeny for the a ribution of responsibility to a computer in a purchase decision experiment mitigates when the subjects have a history of intimate self-disclosure with a computer. In short, subjects' willingness to assign more responsibiliy to a computer for a positive outcome and less responsibility to the computer in a negative outcome increased, when the subjects shared some private information with the computer before the computer-aided purchase decision.
Although humans seem to treat computers and humans o en in a similar way, di erences remain: de Melo et al. (2016) nd that recipients in a Dictator Game expect more money from a machine than from another human. Proposers in an Ultimatum Game o er more money to a human recipient than to an arti cial counterpart. de Melo et al. also show that people are more likely to perceive guilt when interacting with an human counterpart than when interacting with machines. Gogoll and Uhl (2016) nd that people seem to dislike the usage of computers in situations where decisions a ect a third party. In their experiment people could delegate a decision in a trust game either to a human or to a computer algorithm that exactly resembles the human behavior in a previous trust game. Gogoll and Uhl observe that only 26.52% of all subjects delegate their decision to the computer while 73.48% delegated their decision to a human. Gogoll and Uhl also allowed impartial observers to reward or to punish actors depending on their delegation decision.
ey nd that, independent of the outcome, impartial observers reward delegations to a human more than delegation to a computer.
Consequently, especially in domains in which fundamental human properties such as moral considerations and ethical norms are of importance, ndings from human-human interactions can not necessarily be directly transferred to human-computer interactions. Although research in economics and social psychology analyses shared decision-making between humans extensively there seems to be a gap when it comes to shared decision-making with arti cial systems such as computers.
Experimental design
We implemented an experiment with the following elements: (i) a binary Dictator Game in which people were able to choose between an equal and an unequal split, (ii) a questionnaire to measure the preceived responsibility and guilt, and (iii) a manipulation check in which people were confronted with a hypothetical decision situation.
e decision in the binary Dictator Game was made either by a single human dictator (SDT), by two (multiple) human dictators (MDT), or by a computer together with a human dictator (CDT).
General procedures
In each experimental session, the following procedure was used: upon arrival at the laboratory participants were randomly seated and randomly assigned a role (Player X, Player Z, and, depending on the treatment, Player Y). All participants were informed that they would 5 be playing a game with one or two other participants in the room and that the matching would be random and anonymous. ey were also told that all members of all groups would be paid according to the choices made in that group. Payo s were explained using a generic payo table. A short quiz ensured that the task and the payo representation was understood. A er the quiz, the actual payo s were shown to participants together with any other relevant information for the treatment.
All treatments were one-shot dictator games with a binary choice between an equal and an unequal (socially ine cient) wealth allocation. A er making the choice and before being informed about the nal outcome, subjects answered a questionnaire to determine their perceived level of responsibility and guilt. Each participant was paid in private at the end of the experiment. All experimental stimuli as well as instructions were presented through a computer interface. We framed the game as neutrally as possible, avoiding any loaded terms. Payo s were displayed in Experimental Currency Units (ECU's) with an exchange rate from 1 ECU equals 2 Euro. e entire experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . All subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) .
Treatments
We had three di erent treatments in total. One treatment, the so called Single Dictator Treatment or SDT, involved two players, one dictator and a recipient. Two more treatments involved three players, two dictators and one recipient. In one of these treatments, the so called Multiple Dictator Treatment or MDT, all players were humans. In the other treatment, the so called Computer Dictator Treatment or CDT, the decision of one of the dictators was not made by him/herself but instead of by a computer. To compare the three di erent treatments we used a between subject design.
Single dictator treatment (SDT)
Payo s for the SDT are shown in the le part of Table 1 . e dictator -Player X -had to decide between an unequal allocation (Option A) and an equal allocation (Option B). When the dictator chose Option A (Option B) then (s)he received a payo of 6 ECU (5 ECU) and the recipient -Player Z -received a payo of 1 ECU (5 ECU). Payo s for the MDT are shown in the right part of Table 1 . Dictators -Player X and Player Y -both made a choice that determined the payo for both dictators and the recipient. e unequal payo was only implemented if both dictators chose Option A. In all other cases the equal allocation was implemented. For example, if both dictators chose Option A then both dictators received a payo of 6 ECUs while the recipient -Player Z -received a payo of 1 ECU, however, if at least one of the two dictators chose Option B then the dictators as well as the recipient received a payo of 5 ECU.
Computer dictator treatment (CDT)
e CDT was identical to the MDT with one exception: One of the two dictators -Player Y -acted as a so called "passive dictator". While still receiving payo s for Player Y as given in Table 1 , the dictator had no in uence on the choice as the choice was made by a computer. e frequency with which the computer chose options A or B followed the frequency of choices of a randomly selected dictator in an earlier MDT. Participants in the CDT were instructed that frequencies were the same. Hence, all Players X in the CDT had the same beliefs (and the same uncertainty) about the other players' behavior as in the MDT. Furthermore, since payo rules for Player Y in CDT were the same as in MDT, social concerns should not di er between CDT and MDT.
Measurement of perceived responsibility and guilt
A er the dictators made their choices but before participants were informed about the nal outcome and payo , dictators completed a questionnaire.
ey described their perceived personal responsibility for the outcome. ey also described their feeling of guilt if the unequal payo allocation were to be implemented. 6 Dictator(s) were also asked to state their perceived responsibility for the payo of the recipient, and, depending on the treatment, for the payo of the co-dictator. Similar to Forsyth et al. (2002) the perceived and allocated responsibility was measured on a scale from 0 to 100 using a slider. We used these questions as a proxy for the perceived responsibility and guilt for the nal outcome and the perceived responsibility for the other participants. Subjects could also explain why they had chosen a speci c option. Furthermore, in MDT and CDT, dictators were asked to state what they expected the other human co-dictator or the computer to choose and how responsible and guilty they would perceive the human co-dictator or the computer to be if the unequal payo allocation was implemented.
Recipients and, depending on the treatment, passive dictators were asked how they would assess the responsibility and guilt felt by the dictators if the game the unequal payo allocation was implemented. ey were also asked about their expectation how the dictator(s) decide and had the possibility to state why they expected the dictator(s) to choose a speci c option. 6 e wording of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix A.1.2.
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In a manipulation we asked how participants (dictators, recipients and, if present, passive dictators) would evaluate the situation used in the other treatment. We also collected some demographic data. Data and methods are available online. 7
Theoretical framework and behavioral hypotheses
A purely sel sh participant would take into account neither the welfare of others nor situational circumstances. In particular, for a sel sh participant it should not ma er whether the decision was made alone, with another person or with a computer. Similarly, for a participant with xed social preferences the type of the interaction partner, human or computer, should not ma er. However, we know that social preferences depend on the salience of the link between actions and consequences. Chen and Schonger (2013) as well as Haisley and Weber (2010) show that certainty or ambiguity of the outcome ma ers. Grossman and van der Weele (2013), Grossman (2014) and Ma hey and Regner (2011) argue that social preferences are a ected by the availability of excuses which allow individuals to justify a sel sh behaviour. ese ndings can be supported with the help of models of social image concerns (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Grossman, 2015) and models on self-perception maintenance (e.g., Aronson, 2009; Beauvois and Joule, 1996; Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Konow, 2000; Mazar et al., 2008; Murnighan et al., 2001; Rabin, 1995) . According to these models, individuals not only maximize their own output but also want to be perceived by others as kind and fair and want to see themselves in a positive light. However, if these two goals are at odds, choosing an option that maximizes own output causes an unpleasant tension for the individual that can only be reduced by lowering the perceived con ict of interest between the two goals. 8 erefore, as research in social psychology has shown, people seem to act selectively and in a self-serving way when determining whether a self-interested behavior will have a positive or negative impact on their own self-concept or social image and use situational excuses, if available, to justify their decision (e.g., Rabin, 1995; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010) . In this way individuals can blame sel sh actions on the context in which they were made rather than on themselves, thus preserving a comfortable self-image.
If a decision is shared, decision makers are responsible only for a fraction of that decision. Hence, the perceived personal responsibility for a decision might be smaller. Furthermore, as shown in theory by Teroni and Bruun (2011) and in an experiment by Berndsen and Manstead (2007) , the less responsible an individual feels, the less guilt the individial feels for making a sel sh decision. Since the impact of the decision is uncertain, its pivotality is di used. is di usion provides an excuse to reduce responsibility for the nal outcome (e.g., Bartling et al., 2015; Falk and Szech, 2013) . In short, sharing a decision with another human reduces the perceived negative consequences for the self-and social image. is makes it easier to choose a self-serving option.
7 https://www.kirchkamp.de/research/shareMachine.html 8 e unpleasant tension (or in a more formal speech "disutility") is o en described as nothing else than the feeling of guilt (e.g., Berndsen and Manstead, 2007; de Hooge et al., 2011; Stice, 1992) .
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In our experiment, Option B leads to an equal payo for all participants. However, if all decision makers choose Option A, the recipient receives much less than the dictator(s). Option A, hence, might cause more harm to the social and self-image than Option B. Dictators who value a positive perception by others and themselves more than their own monetary gain will have a preference for B. Dictators who value mainly the monetary gain will prefer A.
In the SDT, the nal payo s only depends on the choice of a single dictator. e game o ers no situational excuse to reduce the negative impact on the self-and social image caused by a sel sh decision. Sharing a decision with another decision maker, however, provides the possibility to share the responsibility for the decision and allows room for the interpretation of a sel sh choice as also bene cial for the other decider. is allows the dictator to a ribute a sel sh decision to the situation or circumstance rather than to the own responsibility. 9 us, we expect that dictators in the MDT perceive themselves to be less responsible for the nal outcome (Hypothesis 1.i) and feel less guilty for a sel sh decision (Hypothesis 2.i) than dictators in the SDT. As a result we expect more sel sh decisions in the MDT than in the SDT (Hypothesis 3.i).
Turning to the CDT we must ask whether computer dictators are as responsible as human dictators. Can computers be in the same way responsible for an action? In the literature, we nd in particular the following three conditions required to be held responsible: First, an agent needs to have action power. Action power requires a causal relationship between own actions and the outcome (e.g., Lipinski et al., 2002; May, 1992; Moore, 1999; Nissenbaum, 1994; Scheines, 2002) . Second, the agent must be able to choose freely. Free choice includes the competence to act on the basis of own authentic thoughts and motivations as well as the capability to control one's own behavior (e.g., Fischer, 1999; Johnson, 2006) . ird, to be held responsible requires the ability to consider the possible consequences an action might cause (e.g., Bechel, 1985; Friedman and Kahn, 1992) . Furthermore, some researchers argue that it is necessary to be capable of su ering or gaining from possible blame or praise and thus to be culpable for wrongdoing (e.g., Moor, 1985; Sherman, 1999; Wallace, 1994) . ese conditions would also have to be satis ed by a computer in order for it to be held responsible. While the causal responsibility of a computer for an outcome cannot be denied, a computer neither has a free will nor the freedom of action. A computer is also not able to consider possible consequences of its actions in the same way as a human. Furthermore, a computer is not capable of any kind of emotions. Hence, a computer does not ful ll several of the conditions under which one could hold the computer responsible to the same extent as a human. 10 Research in machine and roboter ethics a ributes only operational responsibility to the most advanced machines today but denies any higher form of (moral) responsibility as today's machines still have a relatively low level of own autonomy and ethical sensitivity (e.g., Allen et al., 2000; DeBaets, 2014; Denne , 1997; Sullins, 2006) .
Based on these considerations, the responsibility for a sel sh outcome can not be shared with a computer to the same extent that it can with a human. e wiggle room is smaller 9 However, as either dictator can independently implemented the equal outcome by choosing Option B the addition of a second dictator does not impede subjects from ensuring a fair outcome if they prefer it. 10 For the discussion on the responsibility of computers see Bechel (1985) , Friedman and Kahn (1992) , Snapper (1985) , and, more recently, Asaro (2011), Floridi and Sanders (2004) , Johnson and Powers (2005) , Sparrow (2007) , and Stahl (2006) . 9 than in a shared decision with another human. us, upholding a positive self-and social image while deciding sel shly together with a computer should not be as easy as when deciding with another human. For these reasons, we expect dictators to perceive more personal responsibility for the nal outcome in the CDT than in the MDT (Hypothesis 1.ii). We also expect them to perceive more guilt when choosing the unfair option (Hypothesis 2.ii) in the CDT than in the MDT. In addition, as sel sh decision-making is in uenced by the individual's perception of being responsible or feeling guilty for a decision, signi cantly more people should choose the sel sh option if they are deciding with another human (MDT) than when deciding with a computer (CDT) (Hypothesis 3.ii).
Hypothesis 1 (responsibility) In MDT participants a ribute less responsibility to an individual dictator for the outcome resulting from choosing the sel sh option than
Hypothesis 2 (guilt) In MDT participants a ribute less guilt to an individual dictator for the outcome resulting from choosing the sel sh option than
Hypothesis 3 (sel shness) In MDT the sel sh option is chosen more frequently than (i) in SDT, or
(ii) in CDT.
Results
All sessions were run in July, October and November 2016 at the Friedrich Schiller Universität Jena. ree treatments were conducted with a total of 399 subjects (65.2% female). 11 Most of our subjects were students with an average age of 25 years. Participants earned on average €9.43. We use a between-subject design, hence, the data for all statistical tests is independent for the di erent treatments. We rst analyze how the perceived responsibility for the nal outcome as well as the feeling of guilt for a self-serving decision varied between the treatments before presenting the ndings regarding the choices made by the dictators. "Outcome" is estion 9 from Appendix A.1.2, "payo co-dictator" is estion 7 from Appendix A.1.2, "payo recipient" is from estion 6 from Appendix A.1.2.
Figure 1: Dictators' responsibility.
Hypothesis 1: responsibility
To assess perceived responsibility for a sel sh decision we ask dictators to state their perceived level of responsibility for three di erent items: for the nal outcome, for the recipient's payo , and (in treatments MDT and CDT) for their co-dictators' payo . 12 For all questions the level of responsibility was measured by a continuous scale from "Not responsible at all" (0) to "Very responsible" (100). Figure 1 shows the distribution of personal responsibility for the three measures: outcome, payo of the other dictator, and payo of the recipient. Figure 1 seems to con rm Hypothesis 1.i. According to this hypothesis responsibility should be smaller in MDT than in SDT. Indeed, this seems to be the case for all three measures.
We nd weaker support for Hypothesis 1.ii. According to this hypothesis responsibility should be smaller in MDT than in CDT. is is clearly the case for responsibility for payo of co-dictator. For the other two measures, however, the gure shows no clear di erence between MDT and CDT. According to Hypothesis 1.ii the di erence in responsibility between CDT and MDT should be positive. We do observe a signi cantly positive di erence for the payo co-dictator measure. However, we nd insigni cant negative di erences for the other two measures.
Hypothesis 2: guilt
In all treatments dictators were asked to state their perceived guilt in case option A was implemented.
e level of guilt was measured by a continuous scale from "not guilty" (0) to "totally guilty" (100). Figure 2 shows the distribution of guilt. According to Hypothesis 2.i, we expect dictators to feel less guilty for an unequal payo in the MDT than in the SDT. Furthermore, according to Hypothesis 2.ii we expect a lower level of guilt in MDT than in CDT. Table 3 provides con dence intervals and p-values for treatment di erences. According to Hypothesis 2.i the di erence in guilt between SDT and MDT should be positive. According to Hypothesis 2.ii the di erence in guilt between CDT and MDT should be positive. Indeed, both di erences are positive, however, not signi cantly so. us, neither Hypothesis 2.i nor Hypothesis 2.ii can be con rmed for dictators. e level of guilt felt by dictators is not signi cantly a ected by the treatment, whether dictators decide on their own, together with a computer or with another human. 
Conclusion
e number of decisions made by human-computer teams have risen substantially in the past. Here, we study whether humans perceive a decision shared with a computer di erently than they perceive a decision shared with another human. More speci cally, we focus on the perceived personal responsibility and guilt for a sel sh decision when a decision is shared with a computer instead of with another human.
Former studies have established that humans behave more sel shly if they share responsibility with other humans. We do nd a similar pa ern in our experiment, even for humancomputer interactions. When decision makers decide on their own, the number of sel sh choices is rather small. When the decision is shared with a computer the number of sel sh choices increases.
e frequency of sel sh choices is highest when the decision is shared with another human. However, these di erences are not very large and, in our study, not 14 For the binary Dictator Game interface shown to the dictators and to the recipients see Appendix A.1.1. 15 We also measure perceived responsibility for the nal outcome, the recipient's payo and the co-dictator's payo . In line with our hypotheses, we nd that responsibility for the outcome is perceived signi cantly stronger when a decision is not shared at all than when it is shared with a human. Also in line with our hypotheses, responsibility for the co-dictator's payo is perceived stronger when the decision is shared with a computer than when the decision is shared with a human.
In our experiment we use a very small manipulation. e way computers decided was fully transparent and could be easily linked to human choices. In the experiment the advantage of such a transparent design is that we can clearly communicate to participants what computers do. Sharing a choice with a computer in our experiment is as forseeable as sharing a choice with with a human. Despite the small manipulation, we did nd some e ects.
In our experiment we did, on purpose, not model the unpredictability of a complex computerised choice. is would be a next step which we have to leave to future research.
For the future, an open discussion of hybrid-decision situations would be desirable. It might not only be important to address the technical question of what we can achieve by using arti cial decision making systems such as computer but also how humans perceive them in di erent situations and how this in uences human decision-making. Darley, J. and Latané, B. (1968) A. Appendix for online publication is section contains additional information on the interfaces and questions used in the treatments. We also present further analyses of data we collected in addition to the data used to test your hypotheses. Data and Methods can be found at https://www.kirchkamp.de/ research/shareMachine.html.
A.1. Interfaces and questions
In this section the interfaces as well as the questions used in the experiment are presented.
A.1.1. Dictator game interface
In the MDT as well as in the CDT dictators used the interface sketched in Figure 4 to enter their decision. Recipients used the interface sketched in Figure 5 to enter their guess. estionnaire All subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire. e questions were asked right a er the decision and before the nal outcome was announced. As an example, the questions used in the MDT for the subject in the roll of Player X are presented below. e used answer method is presented in brackets. e questions asked in the CDT and in the SDT were very similar to the questions asked in the MDT. In the CDT, Player Y did not decide on his/her own and the questions were changed accordingly. Except of the rst three questions all questions were asked in the SDT. Dictators were asked directly, recipients and passive dictators were asked indirectly. For example, recipient and passive dictators were asked how responsible they perceive the dictator(s) to be for the recipients' or the passive dictators' payo and how responsible they expect the dictator(s) to feel for the nal outcome. 16 Recipients and passive dictators were asked who how responsible they perceive the dictator to be for the payo of Player Z. 17 Recipients and passive dictators were asked who how responsible they perceive the dictator to be for the payo of Player Y. 9. Option A will be implemented if you and the other player chose A. In this case, Player X receives 6 ECU, Player Y receives 6 ECU and Player Z receives 1 ECU. Please adjust the slide control, so that it shows how you would perceive your responsibility as well as the responsiility of the other player in a scenario in which Option A is implemented.
[Slider from "I am fully responsible" to "I am not responsible" and slider from "My fellow player is fully responsible" to "My fellow player is not responsible"] (for an analysis of the answers given see Section 5.1 and Appendix A.3 and A.7) 19
A.2. Dictators' perceived influence by co-dictators choice
Dictators in the MDT as well as in the CDT were asked to state if their expectation regarding their co-dictators behavior had an in uence on their own decision. 20 Dictators could either choose "YES" or "NO". In the MDT 34.4% of the dictators and in the CDT 36.1% of the dictators stated that they took the expected decision of their co-dictator into account when making their own decision.
A.3. Dictators' assigned responsibility to the co-dictator by choice
Dictators in the MDT and in the CDT had the possibility to state how responsible they perceive their co-dictator to be for the nal outcome. 21 e co-dictator was either a human (in the MDT) or a computer (in the CDT). As Table 4 shows, dictators in the MDT perceived their fellow dictator, on average, to be signi cantly more responsible than the dictators in the CDT perceived the computer to be. However, as Figure 6 shows, this was mainly driven by dictators who chose Option B.
18 Recipients and passive dictators were asked who how guilty they expect the dictator to feel if Option A would be implemented. 19 Recipients and passive dictators were asked who how responsible they expect the dictator to feel if Option A would be implemented. By comparing the responsibility the dictators assigned to themselves with the responsibility the dictators a ributed to their co-dictators, see Figure 7 , it becomes clear that the di erence is more dispersed in the CDT, where dictators decided together with a computer, than in the MDT, where dictators decided together with another human dictator. Means, however, are similar (p-value 0.1273). In summary, dictators assigned on average less responsibility to a computer in the CDT than to a human co-dictator in the MDT.
A.4. Hypothetical decision if dictators decide as single dictators
Dictators in the MDT as well as in the CDT were asked how they would have decided, if they would have had to decide on their own. Recipients in the MDT and CDT and passive dictators in the CDT were asked how they would have expected the dictator to decide, if they would have had to decide on their own. 22 Dictators as well as recipients were able to insert their assessment by a continuous scale from "Option A" (0) to "Option B" (100). As the le part of Figure 8 shows, a large proportion of the actively deciding dictators in the CDT and in the MDT reported that they would have chosen Option B if they had been forced to decide alone. is was mainly driven by dictators who chose Option B (p-value 0.0000)(see Figure  9 ). As the middle part of Figure 8 shows, it become clear that recipients in the MDT as well as in the CDT expected the dictators to choose Option B less o en were they each deciding alone. As the right part of Figure 8) shows, the passive dictators in the CDT also expected the dictators to choose Option B less o en where they each deciding alone. Figure 10 shows, dictators in the CDT expected the computer to choose Option A on average signi cantly less o en than dictators in the MDT expected their human co-dictator to choose Option A (p-value 0.0023). is was mainly driven by dictators in the MDT who had chosen Option B (p-value 0.0001) (see Figure 11) . As the middle part of Figure 10 shows, recipients in the SDT expected dictators to be more likely to choose Option B than recipients in the MDT (p-value 0.0012). However, recipients in the MDT did not expect a higher likelyhood of sel sh choices by dictators than recipients in the CDT (p-value 0.4382). As the right part of Figure 10 shows, passive dictators in the CDT expected the dictator to be more likely to choose Option A than Option B.
A.6. Recipients' and passive dictators' expected choices
Recipients, and if present passive dictators were asked to their guess on which option the dictators will choose. 25 Table 5 summarises the recipients' and passive dictators ' expecta-23 In the MDT the co-dictator was another human, in the CDT the co-dictator was a computer. "Dictator" and "co-dictator" are estion 9 from Appendix A.1.2, "di erence" shows the di erence between the responsibility allocated to the dictators and the co-dictators.
Figure 12: Dictators' responsibility according to recipients.
tions. Recipients expected signi cantly more sel sh choices (per dictator) in MDT (p-value 26 0.0001) and CDT (p-value 0.0017) than in SDT but expected fewer sel sh choices (per dictator) in CDT than in MDT (p-value 0.0544). e passive dictators' expectations are shown in the right column in Table 5 . More than half of the passive dictators expected the dictator in the CDT to choose the sel sh option.
A.7. Recipients' and passive dictators' assigned responsibility to the dictator(s) for the outcome Recipients, and if present passive dictators were asked how responsible they perceive the human dictator to be for an unfair outcome. Recipients in the MDT and in the CDT were "Dictator" and "co-dictator" are estion 9 from Appendix A.1.2, "di erence" shows the di erence between the responsibility allocated to the dictators and the co-dictators. also asked how responsible they perceive the either human or computer co-dictator to be. 27 e allocated responsibility was measured by a continuous scale from "Not responsible at all" (0) to "Very responsible" (100). As the le part of Figure 12 shows, recipients assigned a signi cantly higher level of responsibility to the dictator(s) in the SDT than to the dictators in the CDT (p-value 0.0056). However, recipients did not perceive the dictators in the MDT to be signi cantly less responsible than dictators in the SDT (p-value 0.2084).
Perhaps not suprisingly, as the middle part of Figure 12 shows, a human dictator in the MDT was on average perceived as signi cantly more responsible for the nal outcome than the computer in the CDT by recipients (p-value 0.0000). Furthermore, as the right part of Figure 12 shows, the allocated responsibility di ered more between the human and the computer dictator in the CDT than between the two human dictators in the MDT (p-value 0.0034).
As the le part of Figure 13 shows, a large proportion of the passive dictators perceived the dictator to be very responsible for the nal decision. As the middle part of Figure Figure  13 shows, the computer was also perceived as responsible for the outcome. In the right part of Figure 13 we compare the responsibility assigned to the dictator with the one of the computer. It becomes clear that a large proportion of the passive dictators hold the dictator far more responsible for the nal outcome than the computer (p-value 0.0000). A.8. Recipients' and passive dictators' assigned responsibility to the human dictator(s) for the co-dictators' and the recipients' payo Recipient, and if present passive dictators, were asked to evaluate how responsible they perceive the dictator(s) to be for the payo of the recipient and, if present, the active or passive co-dictator's payo . 28 e assigned responsibility was measured by a continuous scale from "not responsible at all" (0) to "totally responsible" (100). As Figure 14 shows, recipients in the CDT stated that they perceive the human dictator to be more responsible for the nal payo of the passive dictator as well as for the payo of the recipient than a computer.
By looking at the di erence between the responsibility for the payo of the passive dictator, see Figure 15 , it becomes clear that passive dictators did not perceived the dictator to be signi cantly more responsible than the computer (p-value 0.1594). However, passive dictators hold the dictator more responsible for the recipient's payo than the computer (p-value 0.0119). A.9. Recipients' and passive dictators' assigned guilt to the human dictator(s)
In all treatments recipients, and if present passive dictators were asked to state how guilty they expect the dictators to feel in case Option A would be implemented. 29 e assigned level of guilt was measured by a continuous scale from "not guilty" (0) to "totally guilty" (100). Figure 16 pictures the expected guilt the recipients expected the dictators to perveive in case Option A would be implemented. Recipients in the MDT did not expect the dictators to feel more guilty than recipients in the SDT (p-value 0.2037) or in the CDT (p-value 0.4673) when choosing Option A.
A.10. Manipulation check
A manipulation check was conducted in all treatments.
e wording of the manipulation check in the MDT was "Imagine, now the decision of player X [Y] is made by a computer. e likelihood the computer chooses Option A (Player X receives 6 ECU, Player Y receives 6 ECU and Player Z receives 1 ECU) or Option B (Player X receives 5 ECU, Player Y receives 5 ECU and Player Z receives 1 ECU) is as high as the likelihood experimental subjects chose Option A or Option B in a former experiment. Example: If three out of ten participants in a former experiment, whose decision a ected the payment, chose a particular option the computer would choose that option with a probability of 30%. e participants in the former experiment were not told that their decision would a ect a computer's decision in this experiment. Please compare this decisionmaking situation with the one Player X and Player Y are confronted with in this experiment. ". e wording of the manipulation check in the CDT was "Imagine, now the decision would not be made by a computer but by player Y[X] him/herself. Please compare this decision situation to the situation you were confronted with in this experiment. ". e wording of the manipulation check in SDT was "Imagine, now the decision of player X is made by a computer. " As an example, the questions for Player X used in the MDT manipulation check are presented: 4. Option A will be implemented if you and the computer choose Option A. In this case, Player X receives 6 ECU, Player Y receives 6 ECU and Player Z receives 1 ECU. Please adjust the slide control, so that it shows your preceived responsibility as well as the responsibility you assign to the computer if option A is implemented. [Slider from "I am responsible" to "I am not responsible" and slider from " e computer is fully responsible" to " e computer is not responsible"] (for an analysis of the answers given see Appendix A.10.4 and A.10.5) 33
A.10.1. Responsibility for the co-dictator or passive dictator
Results for dictators are shown in Figure 17 . Perhaps not suprisingly, dictators in the CDT who imagined sharing their decision with a human instead of a computer stated to feel less responsible for the payo of their co-dictator (p-value from a binomial test 0.0000). However, dictators in the MDT who imagined sharing their decision with a computer did not feel more 32 Recipients and passive dictators were asked who how guilty they would expect the dictator to feel in this case if Option A would be implemented. 33 Recipients and passive dictators were asked who how responsible they would expect the dictator to feel in this case if Option A would be implemented. Results for recipients are shown in Figure 18 . Recipients in the CDT expected that dictators, who now would have to decide with another human instead of with a computer, to feel signi cantly less responsible for the payo of their co-dictator than in the experiment before (p-value from a binomial test 0.0000). However, recipients in the MDT did not expect the dictators, who now would have to decide with a computer instead of with another human, to feel signi canlty more responsible for the payo of their co-dictator than before (p-value 0.1435).
Results for passive dictators are shown in Figure 19 . Passive dictators expected the dictators to feel signi cantly less responsible if they were making their decision with another human dictator instead of with a computer (p-value from a binomial test 0.0003).
A.10.2. Responsibility for the recipient
Results for dictators are shown in Figure 20 . Dictators in the CDT perceived themselves to be less responsible for the payo of the recipient once they decide together with a human instead of a computer (p-value from a binomial test 0.0009). Dictators in the MDT did not feel signi cantly more responsible for the payo of the recipient once their human counterpart would be replaced with a computer (p-value from a binomial test 0.2005). Dictators in the SDT felt signi cantly less responsibility for the payo of the recipient if the decision would be made by a computer and not by themselves in the manipulation check (p-value from a binomial test 0.0000).
Results for recipients are shown in Figure 21 . Recipients in the CDT did not expect the dictators, who would have to share their decision with a human instead of a computer, to feel 
A.10.3. Perceived guilt
Results for dictators are shown in Figure 23 . Dictators in the CDT stated to feel less guilty once they would be able to share the decision with a human instead of a computer. However, the e ect is not signi cant (p-value from a binomial test 0.3269). Dictators in the MDT did not feel signi cantly more guilty once their human counterpart was hypothetically replaced with a computer (p-value from a binomial test 0.0963). However, dictators in the SDT would feel signi cantly less guilty when the decision would have been made by a computer (p-value from a binomial test 0.0000).
Results for recipients are shown in Figure 24 . Recipients in the CDT expected the dictators to feel less guilty when they are sharing the decision with another human (p-value from a binomial test 0.0576). However, in the MDT the number of recipients expected the dictators to feel more guilty or less guilty when deciding together with a computer instead of with another human was quite evenly distributed (p-value from a binomial test 1.0000). Recipients in the SDT expected the dictators to feel less guility when the decision is made by a computer and not by the dictator himself/herself (p-value from a binomial test 0.0000). Results for passive dictators are shown in Figure 25 . Passive dictators expected that the dictators feel less guilty, if they would have to decide together with another human than when they decide together with a computer (p-value from a binomial test 0.0005).
A.10.4. Dictators perceived personal responsibility and assigned responsibility to a human dictator or a computer e personal responsibility perceived by the dictators in the manipulation check is shown in Figure 26 . As was to be expected, dictators in the SDT claimed to perceive themselves to be not very responsible if they had the decision been made by a computer. Interestingly, dictators in the CDT felt less responsible for the nal payo if they had to decide with another human dictator than dictators in the MDT imagining they had to decide with a computer (pvalue 0.0022).
For a comparison of the relative change between the perceived personal responsibility in the hypothetical situation and the perceived personal responsibility in the actual experiment by choice see Figure 27 . Dictators in the SDT stated that they would feel less responsible if a computer were to decide on their behalf (p-value 0.0000). Furthermore, the perceived personal responsibility increased for dictators in the MDT when they imagine their counterpart replaced by a computer (p-value 0.0260). However, the perceived personal responsibility did not decrease signi cantly for dictators in the CDT when their counterpart was hypothetical resplaced by a human (p-value 0.8388). As the le part of Figure 27 shows, this was mainly driven by dictators who chose Option B.
e responsibility assigned to the co-dictator by the dictators in the manipulation check is shown in Figure 28 . While in the SDT the computer's responsibility was assigned equally, signi cantly more responsibility was assigned to a hypothetical human dictator in the CDT maipulation check than to a hypothetical computer dictator in the MDT manipulation check (p-value 0.0002). e increase or decrease in the responsibility assigned to the other dictator between the hypothetical situation and the actual experiment by choice is shown in Figure 29 .
e responsibility a ributed to the co-dictator in the CDT increased signi cantly once the other player is no longer a computer but a human (p-value 0.0392). Similarly, responsibility decreases signi cantly in the MDT once the other player is no longer a human but a computer (p-value 0.0000). As the le part of Figure 29 shows, this was even stronger for dictators who chose Option B.
A.10.5. Recipients' and passive dictators' assigned responsibility to a human dictator or a computer e responsibility of the dictator(s) for the nal payo perceived by recipients in the manipulation check is shown in Figure 30 . Recipients in the SDT perceived the dictators to be not very responsible had the decision been made by a computer. Furthermore, recipients in the CDT, where the switch was made from a computer to human co-dictator, perceived the dictators to be less responsible for an unfair outcome than the recipients in the MDT, where the switch was made from a human to computer co-dictator (p-value 0.0298).
e responsibility of the dictator for the nal payo perceived by passive dictators in the manipulation check is shown in Figure 31 . Passive dictators perceived the dictators to be also For a comparison of the relative changes in the recipients' perception of the responsibility of the dictator(s) for an unfair outcome in the hypothetical situation and in the actual experiment see Figure 32 . Recipients in the SDT assigned less responsibility for an unfair outcome to the dictator when a computer were to decide on her behalf (p-value 0.0000). However, recipients did not perceive the dictators to be signi cantly more responsible for an unfair outcome in the MDT when their counterpart was hypothetically replaced by a computer (pvalue 0.9590). e same applies for the CDT, recipients did also not perceive the dictators to feel less responsible for an unfair outcome if the computer would be replaced by a human dictator (p-value 0.3054).
For a comparison of the relative changes between the perceived responsibility of the dictator(s) for the outcome in the hypothetical situation and in the actual experiment by passive dictators see Figure 33 . A large but not signi cant proportion of the passive dictators perceived the dictator to be less responsible if their counterpart is a human instead of a computer (p-value 0.1382).
e responsibility assigned by the recipients in the manipulation check to the either human or computer co-dictator is shown in Figure 34 . A computer that decides which option will be implemente on its own, as in the SDT, is perceived as signi cantly more responsible as a computer, that determined the nal outcome together with a human dictator, as in the MDT, by the recipients (p-value 0.0031). In addition, the human dictator in the CDT was also perceived as more responsible for an unfair outcome than the computer in the MDT (p-value 0.0001).
e responsibility assigned by the passive dictators in the manipulation check to the ei- ther human or computer co-dictator is shown in Figure 35 . Passive dictators preceived both human dictators to be responsible to the same extent for the nal outcome (p-value 0.8159). For a comparison of the relative change in the recipients' perception of the responsibility of the co-dictator(s) for an unfair outcome in the hypothetical situation and the actual experiment see Figure 36 . Recipients in the MDT assigned signi cantly less responsibility for an unfair outcome to the computer in the manupulation check than they assigned to the human dictator in the actual experiment (p-value 0.0000). Correspondingly, recipients in the CDT assigned signi cantly more responsiblity to the human dictator for an unfair outcome in the manipulation check than they assigned to the computer in the actual experiment (p-value 0.0483).
For a comparison of the relative changes in the passive dictators' responsiblility assigned to the human dictator(s) in the hypothetical situation and the computer in the actual experiment see Figure 37 . Passive dictators perceived a hypothetical human dictator in the manipulation check to be signi cantly more responsible for the nal outcome than the computer in the actual experiment (p-value 0.0003). 
